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in a Schumpeterian Growth Model
with Sequential Innovation
Silvia Galli*
University of Rome “La Sapienza”
In the standard quality-ladder growth models, R&D firms
undertake independent innovation processes to discover ideas
whose value immediately transfers into tradeable applications. Here
the standard multisector neo-Schumpeterian growth theory is
extended by decomposing product innovation into a two-stage
uncertain research activity. 
I compare the general equilibrium innovative performance of an
economy where early-stages scientific results are patentable with the
general equilibrium innovative performance with unpatentable basic
ideas freely disseminated by public research institutions (universities).
I show that the widely documented increasing complexity experienced
in applied R&D magnifies the public basic R&D inefficiencies and
suggests the patentability of research tools. [JEL Classification: O31,
O34, O41]
1. - Introduction
A wide literature on the economics of innovation recognizes
sequentiality as distinctive characteristic of the innovative process.
«As Susanne Scotchmer (1991) argues:
Sir Isaac Newton himself acknowledged, “If I have seen far, it
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responsibility of the Author.is by standing on the shoulders of giants”. Most innovators stand
on the shoulders of giants, and never more so than in the current
evolution of high technologies, where almost all technical progress
builds on a foundation provided by earlier innovators. For example,
most molecolar biologists use the basic technique for inserting genes
into bacteria that was pioneered by Herbert Boyer and Stanley
Cohen in the early 1970s, (...). In pharmaceuticals, many drugs like
insulin, antibiotics, and anti-clotting drugs have been progressively
improved as later innovators bettered previous technologies».
1
Yet, the formal literature on standard Schumpeterian growth
theory (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion e Howitt, 1992 and
1998; Segerstrom, 1998; Howitt, 1999) misses to take the
sequential and cumulative nature of ideas at pre-commercial
stages of development into the appropriate consideration. In these
models, the innovation process is governed by a Poisson process,
by which an idea is instantaneously conceived and implemented
into a new product to be sold to the marketplace. Of course, the
Schumpeterian growth theory acknowledges the intertemporal
spillovers and the sequentiality for marketable products. However,
in many real world cases, R&D firms have experience multiple-
stage research activities before developing tradeable applications
of basic scientific ideas.
Several examples of the sequential behaviour of research
activity come from biotechnology field
2. Think about the human
embryonic stem cell discovery, patented in 1998 by Wisconsin
University, whose exclusive license for experimental use (regarding
three cell types) was granted to Geron to develop new organic
materials useful for the treatment of important diseases. Could
one state that Wisconsin University’s scientific achievement was
lacking economic value just because further research was required
to render it applicable for commercial purpose? Such a statement
would prove restrictive and simplistic in an age in which a large
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1 SCOTCHMER S. (1991, pag. 29).
2 In 1980, in the Diamonds v. Chakrabarty case, the Supreme Court of United
States ruled that microorganisms produced by genetic engineering could be
patented. The Supreme Court’s decision arrived two years before the introduction
of the first commercial product, human insulin, obtained with recombinant DNA
techniques.part of the international academic community, jointly with a large
part of the R&D business community, expresses the need for an
appropriate intellectual property design to take into account both
the sequential and cumulative nature of ideas and the change in
the technological paradigm determined by the biotechnology
industry
3. The possibility, regarding a number of countries, and
in particular the United States, to patent scientific findings with
no consideration of their commercial value and, above all, with
no consideration of their status of research tools, motivated a lot
of theoretical and empirical microeconomics works
4.
Basic R&D activity is traditionally characterized by a strong
presence of the public sector. Universities have always been the
main investor in basic R&D in the United States, where, in 2004,
they accounted for 55% of domestic basic research. An important
reason for relatively low private contribution to basic R&D is often
found in the high degree of uncertainty that this activity involves
in terms of future commercial application and success. Certainly,
the patentability of early-stage ideas, by granting monopolistic
rents on the applied R&D market to the research tool patent
holders, shifts the debate on the merits of public basic research
over private basic research from appropriability concerns to other
issues, as, for instance, the organization and the objectives of
research activity and the monetary and non monetary incentives
guiding research activity in the two systems (Lach and Shanker-
man, 2003; Aghion, Dewatripont and Stein, 2005).
Jensen and Thursby (2001) study the licensing practices of 62
US universities. The authors find that over 75% of the inventions
licensed were in such an embryonic state of development, that no
one could estimate their commercial potential and the inventor’s
cooperation was required to get a successful commercial develop-
ment.
A first theoretical attempt to grasp the sequential nature of
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3 According to GAMBARDELLA A. (1995) and HENDERSON R. - ORSENIGO L. - PISANO
G. (1999), the pharmaceutical research industry is now more influenced by prior
scientific discoveries respect to the past.
4 For shortness, just a few of such contributions will be cited in this paper.
For a more complete and significative survey, see NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
(2003) and (2004).the innovation process — i.e. the lack of coincidence of the
conception of an idea and its implementation in a tradeable good
— by an economic growth model is Guido Cozzi (2001). The
author develops a Schumpeterian growth model with industrial
espionage. By introducing in the Aghion and Howitt’s, (1992 and
1998) basic Schumpeterian model the possibility for an idea, or
for an essential part of it, to be stolen and afterward used by
agents distinct from the inventor, Cozzi demonstrates that an
increase in the number of researchers entails an increasing
incentive to industrial espionage and sets an upper bound to the
steady state equilibrium per-capita growth rate.
This paper is intended to highlight the opportunity of studying
the sequential nature of the innovation process in a dynamic
general equilibrium framework, in order to evaluate the conditions
under which an intellectual property design is effectively able to
promote economic growth. In particular, by taking the R&D
sequentiality into the Schumpeterian paradigm, it allows to
investigate the relation between the cumulative uncertainty
involved in the two-stages innovation process and the concept of
increasing complexity in the R&D activity (Kortum 1993 and 1997;
Segerstom, 1998).
The assumption of infinitely-lived patents, for the sake of
simplicity often made within the contest of the Schumpeterian
literature and in the industrial organization models as well, has
often been rightly criticised because of its lack of realism. In fact,
although in most countries the statutory patent life is twenty years,
several studies on this subject show that the effective patent life
is substantially shorter. Besides, the enforcement of the exclusive
rights that patents virtually attribute to inventors is often denied
in the case of declaratory judgement for patent infringement. This
is true not only for the circumstance that the declaratory process
may be costly and risky
5, but also because patented scientific
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5 In fact, patents involved in litigations are frequently invalidated by the courts. 
As emphasized by some authors, during the last twenty years, there was an
expansion of the patent breadth (a patent breadth specifies a set of products that
no other firm can produce without permission from the patent-holder in the form
of a licensing agreement), thus increasing more and more the probability of a
lawsuit for patent infringement.knowledge can be lawfully imitated even before the twenty years
old patent expires. Also for this reasons, some authors (Cohen et
al, 2000) highlight that the US data point out a situation in which,
in most cases, R&D firms prefer to rely on trade secrets, rather
than to patent, as a protection mechanism for their innovative
ideas.
Now, in order to evaluate the option of trade secrets as an
alternative to patents we need to consider, from the perspective
of static social welfare, that, if the expected duration of the secret
equals the patent life
6, the social deadweight loss due to the
monopolistic distortion is the same regardless of the circumstance
that the innovative firms rely on either protection mechanisms; in
both cases, in fact, firms are perfectly able to fix their price above
the marginal cost, apart from considering the origin, legal or not,
of the actual monopoly. Still, from a social planner’s perspective,
who has the collective innovation level at heart, secrecy entails
the drawback of cancelling out the scientific knowledge spillovers
that are the other natural face of the legal monopoly.
Besides, within the contest of sequential innovation we want
to analyse, secrecy as a protection mechanism for the innovative
ideas, may impede important commercial developments for such
ideas. If, in fact, the difficulty of selling legally unprotected ideas
is widely recognised (see Arrow, 1962; Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006
and Denicolò, 2007), from the other side, it is necessary to
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O’DONOGHUE T. - ZWEIMÜLLER J. (2004) analyse the effect on the aggregate R&D
of several patent policies directed to strengthen the patent generated inventor’s
monopoly power. In a general economic equilibrium model, O’Donoghue and
Zweimüller find that the circumstance that different industries adopt patent
protection can imply that output distortions created by patents are moderated by
the positive effects on the aggregate output. In particular, according O’Donoghue
and Zweimüller, in particular both patentability requirement and leading breadth,
by influencing the characteristics of new products, could counteract the tendencies
of the economy towards suboptimally-sized innovations.
JAFFE A.B. - LERNER J. (2004) identify with the lowering of the patentability
requirement (in particular referring to the novelty and non-obviousness
requirements), and the resulting proliferation of bad or technically dubious patents,
the increasing in the costs connected with the defence of patents. Besides, the authors
add, the weakening of the patentability requirement, far away from determining an
increase in the number of product innovations, mainly caused a lowering in the
number of innovations (new products on the market) to patents ratio.
6 Here, I am following DENICOLÒ V.  (2007)’s argument.consider that, behind the limits of a theoretical model, in the more
general case of n R&D steps needed in order to achieve one single
product innovation, as n increases the probability of disclosuring
the secret to external individuals increases proportionally. 
These remarks, far away from entering a detailed analysis on
the opportunity for a single firm to rely on trade secrets rather
than patent their scientific findings, explain why, besides the
greater availability and reliability of the data, here I have chosen
the number of patents granted to residents as an indicator for the
innovative performance of the United States from 1953 to 1982
7.
Graph 1 shows the time series of the patents granted to
residents in the United States from 1953 to 1992. By simply
observing the data we infer that the time series does not exhibit
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7 Patent statistics are available for wider samples (JAFFE A.B. - LERNER J., 2004).
The choice of this sample has been determined in view of the consideration that
during the early Eighties, in the United States the change occurred in the
jurisprudential orientation that led to the patentability of the research tools.
Therefore, it seems appropriate, in order to understand the relation between the
cumulative uncertainty involved in the two-stages innovation process and the
increasing complexity in the applied R&D activity, to depict the innovative
performance in the country, as it was in a pre-Eighties patent regime.
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Source: WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION.any trend. The growth rate of the number of patents granted to
US residents in the period points out a pattern oscillating around
a null mean, showing, at least at a first look, the distinctive
characteristics of a weakly stationary stochastic process
8.
Graph 3 shows that in thirty years the applied R&D
expenditure in the US quadrupled, from 7065 million dollars in
1953 to 29142 million dollars in 1982 (year 2000 dollars).
These data point out that in thirty years in the US applied
R&D expenditure considerably increased, whereas the number of
patents granted each year to residents maintained a constant range
of variation.
By theoretically exploring the multiple-stages uncertain nature
of research activity within the Schumpeterian framework, we cast
some light on the incentives that firms have to engage a follow-
on discovery R&D. I hope this might help understanding new ways
of providing incentives for the commercialization of new
technologies and for the promotion economic growth.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets
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8 A stochastic process is said to be weakly stationary (or covariance stationary)
if its first and second order moments are time independent. For a formal definition
of a weakly stationarity, see HAMILTON J.D. (1994, pages 45-46).
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Source: WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION.up a Schumpeterian model with sequential innovation in two
different patent policy scenarios. In the first scenario (case A)
basic R&D achievements are patented and, afterwards, developed
into tradable applications within a completely privatized economy.
In the second scenario (case B) basic research findings are
conceived and put into the public domain, and subsequently
embodied into marketable products by a large number of perfectly
competitive private R&D firms. In Section 3 we try to assess, on
the basis of the analytical structure provided by the model, the
relative advantages and disadvantages of granting no intellectual
protection to half-ideas. Finally, the main results are summarized
in Section 5.
2. - The Model
2.1 Overview
Consider an economy made up of a final good sector and a
research and development (R&D) sector, along the lines of
Grossman and Helpman (1991), where product improvements
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GRAPH 3
INFLATION ADJUSTED APPLIED R&D EXPENDITURE









































































Source: NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD (2006, Vol. 2, Appendix 4-12).occur in consumption goods. Within each industry, firms are
distinguished by the quality of final good they produce. When the
state-of-the-art quality product in an industry ω∈[0,1] is jt(ω),
research firms compete in order to learn how to produce jt(ω) +1st
quality product. This learning process involves a two-stages
innovation path, so first a firm catches a glimpse of the innovation
through the jt(ω) +1/2th inventive half-idea and then other firms
engage in a patent race to implement it in the jt(ω) +1st quality
product.
In what follows we refer to the term “quality leader” to denote
the firm that produces the current state-of-the-art quality product.
We will call “half-idea follower”, or simply the follower
9, the R&D
firm that owns the first half-idea invented in order to introduce,
in the second stage, the product’s innovation that pushes up the
quality ladder. Finally, we let the term “outsider” denote the R&D
firm who tries to invent a new first half idea in the basic research
sector (i.e. tries to become the new follower). We assume that
firms are able to instantaneously patent both the inventive half-
idea and the product innovation. Then, patent protection
determines a monopolistic position both in the applied R&D sector
and in the final good sector, and the winner of the final patent
R&D race become the sole producer of a jt(ω) +1
st quality
consumption product. Research firms rationally choose on which
stage of the innovation process to settle in by simply comparing
the expected benefits from the total R&D effort and its costs.
Time is continuous with an unbounded horizon and there is
a continuum infinitely-lived dynasties of households with identical
intertemporally additive preferences. Heterogeneous labour, skilled
and unskilled, is the only factor of production and the whole
endowment of labour is constant over time. Let M denote the
unskilled labour amount, given at the aggregate level. Let L denote
the economy-wide skilled labour endowment. Both labour markets
are assumed perfectly competitive. In the final good sectors
Patents and Research Tools, etc. S. GALLI
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9 The terminology “leader”, here adopted, is someway intended to recall in the
reader’s mind the expression “follow on R&D activity” often used within the
literature on the economics of innovation to denote sequential and cumulative
R&D activity.ω∈[0,1], monopolistically competitive firms produce differentiated
consumption goods by combining skilled and unskilled labour,
whereas research firms employ only skilled labour.
2.2 Households
The representative household’s preferences are represented by
the following intertemporal utility function:
(1)
where  ρ>0 is the subjective discount rate and E0 denotes the
expectation operator at time t=0. Instantaneous utility u(t) is
defined as:
(2)
where djt(ω) is the quantity consumed of a good of quality j (that
is, a product that has experienced with j quality jumps) and
produced in industry ω at time t. Assume that j is forced to assume
integer values
10. Parameter γ >1 measures the size of quality
upgrades (i.e., the magnitude of innovations). This formulation,
the same of Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Segerstrom
(1991), assumes that each consumer prefers higher quality
products.
The representative consumer is endowed with L>0 units of
skilled labor and M>0 units of unskilled labor. Since labour bears
no disutility it will be inelastically supply for any level of non
negative wages. Population is assumed constant and it is
normalized to 1. Hence L and M will also equal, in equilibrium,
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10  This assumption is common in the quality-ladder endogenous growth
literature; still, in our framework, it has the meaning of explicitly stating that half-
ideas discoveries do not affect consumer’s utility.Unskilled labor can only be employed in the final goods
production. Skilled labour is the most versatile, being also able to
perform R&D activities.
In the first step of the consumer’s dynamic maximization
problem, she selects the set  Jt(ω) of the existing quality levels with
the lowest quality-adjusted prices. Then, at each instant, the
households allocate their income to maximize the instantaneous
utility  (2), taking product prices as given in the following
expenditure constraint equation:
(3)
Here E(t) denotes consumption expenditure and pjt(ω) is the
price of a product of quality j produced in industry ω at time t.
Only a good with the lowest quality-adjusted price is
consumed, since there is no demand for any other good j ∉ Jt(ω).
We  also assume, as usual, that if two products have the same
quality-adjusted price, consumers will buy the higher quality
product although they are formally indifferent between the two
products, because the quality leader can always slightly lower the
price of its product and drive the others out of the market.
Let us define jt*(ω)≡max{j  : j∈Jt(ω)}. The solution to this
maximization problem yields the static demand function:
(4)
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73Therefore, given the independent and — in equilibrium and
by the law of large number — deterministic evolution of the
quality jumps and prices, the consumer will only choose the
piecewise continuous expenditure trajectory, E(⋅), that maximizes
the following functional:
(7)
Assume that all consumers possess equal shares of all firms
at time t=0. Letting A(0) denote the present value of human capital
plus the present value of asset holdings at t=0 each household’s




0 r (s) ds represents the equilibrium cumulative real
interest rate up to time t.
Finally, the representative consumer chooses the time pattern
of consumption expenditure to maximize (7) subject to the
intertemporal budget constraint (8). The optimal expenditure
trajectory satisfies the Euler equation:
(9) E ˙ (t)/E (t)=r (t)–ρ
where r(t)=R ⋅(t) is the instantaneous market interest rate at time
t.
Euler equation (9) implies that a constant (steady state) per-
capita consumption expenditure is optimal when the instantaneous
market interest rate equals the consumer’s subjective discount rate.
Since preferences are homothetic, in each industry aggregate
demand is proportional to the representative consumer’s one, so in
what follows we use E to denote the aggregate consumption
spending and d to denote the aggregate demand.
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In this section we examine the production side of the
economy. We assume constant returns to scale technologies in the
(differentiated) manufacturing sectors represented by the
following production functions: 
(10) y (ω)=x
α (ω) M
1–α (ω), for all ω∈[0, 1]
where α∈(0,1), y(ω) denotes output flow per unit time, x(ω) and
M(ω) are, respectively, skilled and unskilled labour employment
flows in industry ω∈[0,1].
Letting ws and wu, denote skilled and unskilled wage rates, in
each industry, the quality leader seeks to minimize its total cost
flow C=wsx(ω)+ wuM(ω) subject to constraint (10). For y(ω)=1, the
solution to this minimization problem yields the conditional




Thus the (minimum) cost function C(ws, wu,y) is: 
(13) C (ws, wu, y)=c (ws, wu) y
where c(ws, wu) is the per-unit cost function:
(14)
Since unskilled labour is uniquely employed in the final
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75good sectors and all price variables (including wages) are
assumed to instantaneously adjust to their market clearing
values, unskilled labour aggregate demand =∫
1
0M(ω)dω, is equal
to its aggregate supply, M, in any instant. Since industries are
symmetric and their number is normalized to 1, in equilibrium
11
M(ω)=M.
Letting wu=1, from equations (11) and (12) we get the firm’s
skilled labour demand negatively depending on skilled (/unskilled)
wage (ratio):
(15)
In each industry, at each instant, firms compete in prices.
Given equation (4), within each industry product innovation is
non-drastic
12, hence the quality leader will fix its (limit) price p
by charging a mark-up γ over the unit cost (remember that
parameter γ measures the size of product quality jumps):
(16)
Hence each monopolist earns a flow of profit:
(17)
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11 In general, if there were a mass N>0 of final good industries, in equilibrium
M(ω)=(M/N).
12 We are following AGHION P. - HOWITT P. (1992) and (1998) definition of drastic
innovation as generating a sufficiently large quality jump to allow the new
monopolist to maximize profits without risking the re-entry of the previous
monopoly. Given the unit elastic demand, here the unconstrained profit
maximizing price would be infinitely high: that would induce the previous
incumbent to re-enter.From eq. (17) follows:
(18)
Interestingly, eq. (18) implies that in equilibrium total
expenditure is always constant.
2.4 R&D Sectors
In each industry, R&D activity is conceived as a step-by-step
process through which, first a new idea is invented and then it is
used to find the way to introduce a higher quality product. The
concept of half-idea of basic R&D activity provided by the National
Science Board (2006):
«The objective of basic research is to gain more comprehen-
sive knowledge or understanding of the subject under study with-
out specific applications in mind. In industry, basic research is
defined as research that advances scientific knowledge but does
not have specific immediate commercial objectives, although it
may be performed in fields of present or potential commercial in-
terest».
13
A) Patentable Research Tools
We  assume that once the half-idea is invented it is
immediately protected by an infinitely-lived patent. With this
assumption we impose the publicity about the state-of-the-art of
research activity in each industry and exclude the possibility for
an outsider firm to lie announcing a false half-idea finding in order
to discourage its competitors.
Imagine that the half-idea patent holder can only grant an
exclusive license. The licensee of the patent for the research tool
is the only one who can use it to invent a completed new product.
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13 NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD (2006, Vol. 1, Chap. 4, page 8).Following Aghion and Howitt (1998, Ch. 7), assume that each
R&D firm faces an ∪-shaped unit cost function. Let i=F,O denote
a follower and an outsider R&D firm respectively, Ni, with i=F,O,
indicates the mass of follower and, respectively, outsider firms in
each R&D sector. Since we assumed that the half-idea patent
holder can only grant an exclusive license, in equilibrium we have
NF = 1
14.
The individual firm’s Poisson process probability intensity to
succeed in inventing a half-idea or completing one (i.e. introducing
the product innovation) is θi(zi – ‚φ,Ni), increasing and concave,
depending on the R&D effort zi, in excess of the fixed cost, in
terms of labour input, φ>0, that each firm has to pay per-unit time
in order to engage in the R&D race. In particular, we specify the
per-unit time Poisson probability intensity to succeed for an
outsider and a follower firm respectively as:
(19)
(20)
where λk > 0, k =0 ,1, are R&D laboratory productivity constants;
Ni (i = O, F) represent the number of laboratories in each industry
and constant a>0 is an inter-firm intra-sectoral congestion
parameter, capturing the risk of R&D duplications, knowledge
theft and other diseconomies of fragmentation in the R&D.
From the Poisson process proprieties, the probability of
simultaneously inventing two half-ideas in a tiny interval of time
of duration ∆t is a zero of order higher than the first. If instead
an outsider R&D firm invents a second half-idea after the inventor
of a first half-idea has already been granted a patent, the patent
office will not grant a second patent on that half-idea, based on
   
θφ λ φ FF F F F
a zN z N (, m a x , −≡ − ()
− ) 1 0
   
θφλ φ OO O O O
a zN z N (, m a x , −≡ − ()
− ) 0 0
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14  However, in general, the production technology in each R&D sector is
expressed by equations (19)-(20), in which NF and  NO must be determined
endogenously within the general economic equilibrium conditions of the model.the legal principle of patentability requirement (O’Donoghue 1998,
O’Donoghue and Zweimüller, 2004), because the second half-idea
does not promise to generate further utility gains to the consumer.
Therefore no second R&D firm will ever invest resources in
inventing a half-idea on which it will not be able to claim
intellectual property rights. As a result, in any instant of time, no
industry will have more than one follower at any moment in time
and the whole set of industries ω∈ [0,1], gets partitioned into two
sets of industries: industries ω∈A0, (temporarily) with no half-ideas
and, therefore, with one quality leader (the final product patent
holder), no followers and a mass of outsider firms, and the
industries ω∈A1=[0,1]\ A0, with one half-idea and, therefore, one
half-idea leader (the final product patent holder) and one follower
(the half-idea patent holder). Firms engage in basic R&D only in
ω∈A0, industries and engage in applied R&D activity aimed at a
direct product innovation only in A1 industries. When a quality
improvement occurs in an industry ω∈A1 the half-idea follower
becomes the new quality leader and the industry switches from
A1 to  A0. When an inventive half-idea discovery arises in an
industry ω∈A0 this industry switches to A1 and the winner of the
first-stage patent race is the new follower. Graph 4 illustrates the
flow of industries from a condition to the other:
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GRAPH 4
REPRESENTATION OF THE ECONOMY
BY FLOWS OF INDUSTRIESNotice that the two sets A0 and A1 change over time, even if
the economy will eventually admit a steady state. At any instant
we can measure the mass of industries without any half-idea as
m (A0) ∈ [0, 1], and the mass of industries with an uncompleted
half-idea as m (A1)=1–m (A0). Clearly, in a steady state these
measures will be constant and equal to each other, as the flows
in and out will offset each other. 
In light of the definitions so far, we can express the skilled
labor market equilibrium as:
(L’) L = x (wt)+m (A0) NOzO + m (A1) NFzF
stating that, at each date, the aggregate supply of skilled labor, L,
finds employment in the manufacturing sectors, x(wt), in all [0,1],
in the A0 sectors, NOzO, and in the A1 sectors, NF zF.
Assuming that the patent holder — the “follower” — can
license the research tool to only one R&D firm, we impose NF =1.
Each Poisson process governing the two-stage innovative
process is supposed to be independent. The stock value of all firms
is determined by privately arbitraging between risk free
consumption loans, firm bonds and equities, viewed as perfect
substitutes also due to the ability of financial intermediaries to
perfectly diversify portfolios and eliminate risk
15.
Letting  VO,  VF
1,  VL
0 and  VL
1, denote respectively the present
expected value of being an outsider firm (VO), a half-idea follower
(VF
1), a quality leader (VL
0) and a half-idea leader (VL
1); the
following Bellman’s equations must hold in equilibrium:
(21a)
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15  Hence, despite individuals’ being risk averse, average returns will be
deterministic, the risk premia will be zero, and agents will only compare expected
returns. A usual in this class of models, we invoke the law of large numbers, which
allows individuals who invest in a continuum of sectors with idiosyncratic risk to
transform probabilities into frequencies. (21c)
(21d)
Equation (21a) states that the risk free income deriving from
the liquidation of the expected present value of an outsider R&D
firm in an A0 industry,  rVO, is equal to the expected gain from
becoming a follower, 
i.e. the patent holder on the next half-idea in an A1 industry, minus
the R&D expenditure, wszO, plus the gradual stock market
appreciation in the case of the half-idea not occurring, dVO/dt.
Equation (21b) equals the risk free income deriving from the
liquidation of the expected present value of follower R&D firm in
an  A1 industry, rVF
1, and the expected increase in value from
becoming a quality leader (i.e. completing the product innovation
process), 
minus the relative R&D cost, wszF, plus the gradual appreciation
in the case of R&D success not arriving, dV
1
F/dt.
Equation (21c) states that the risk free income deriving from
the liquidation of the expected present value of a leader in an A0
industry,  VL
0, equals the flow of profit π, minus the capital loss
from being challenged by a half-idea on a better product in case
a follower appears,
plus gradual appreciation in case of such event not occurring
within a year, dVL
0/dt.
Finally, equation (21d) equals the risk free income deriving
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81from the liquidation of the value function of a leader in an A1
industry, rVL
1, to the relative flow of profit π, minus the expected
loss deriving from the follower’s success,
plus gradual appreciation in case obsolescence does not occur,
dVL
1/dt.
Each perfectly competitive outsider firm determines the
amount of labour devoted to basic research zO
* by trying to
maximize its expected profit flow.
LEMMA 1 a) The equilibrium amount of labour employed by
each outsider R&D firm is zO
* =2 φ.
b) The positive R&D equilibrium value of the skilled wage
ratio is
PROOF (in APPENDIX 1.A)
Interestingly, unlike the usual features of previous quality
ladders models
16, in this model, due to decreasing returns at the
industry level, there is no indeterminacy in the intersector
allocation of R&D labor.
Let us now turn to the follower’s problem. The following
LEMMA 2 holds:
LEMMA 2. The optimal amount of labour employed in research
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16 See COZZI G. (2007) for a proof of indeterminacy in quality ladders models.PROOF (in APPENDIX 1.A).





Equations  (22a)-(22c) are a first order system of ordinary
differential equations describing the dynamics of the stock market
value of all non-zero profit firms in this economy. Plugging eq.s
(15) and (17) into the expression of the skilled labour wage ratio
(LEMMA 1b)), we obtain:
(23)
Therefore the skilled labor employment in the manufacturing
sector is inversely related to the market value of half-patented
ideas. Higher valued research tools draw more skilled labor from
the manufacturing plants into the basic research laboratories,
thereby increasing the manufacturing unskilled/skilled labor ratio
and consequently raising skilled labor marginal productivity and
real wages. Since the patent on a half-idea does not derive value
from the direct production of a marketable good VF
1, is in turn
pinned down by rVL
0. Therefore, the equilibrium value of the
unskilled wage is indirectly related to the stream of profits
expected from the future commercialization of the product of the
completed idea. Unlike the traditional Schumpeterian innovative
process, the skilled wage here does not immediately incorporate
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83patent, but it does so only one step ahead: the value of the future
monopolist is scaled down to current R&D labor wage by the
composition of two innovation probabilities.
The skilled labor market clearing condition states that in each
instant the following relation must hold:
(24) m (A0) NOzO
* +( 1–m (A0)) zF
* + x = L
Hence, since wages are pinned down by the optimal firm size
and zero profit perfectly competitive basic R&D labor market, the
unique equilibrium per-sector mass of entrant basic R&D firms
consistent with skilled labor market clearing (24) is determined
by solving equation (24) for NO:
(25)
To  complete our analysis, let us look more closely at the
macroeconomic dynamics depicted by Graph 4. In the set of basic
research industries a given number of perfectly competitive (freely
entered) outsider firms, NO, employ a flow of labour input zO
* to
get a flow probability of becoming A1 followers, while, in the set
of innovative industries the only per-industry follower (NF =1)
employs a flow of labour input zF
* to obtain a flow probability to
succeed in implementing the state-of-the-art research level. The
flows of probability, i.e. the per-unit time probabilities, for the
individual firm to pass from A0 to A1 and from A1 to A0, at the
aggregate level, become deterministic frequencies of industries
flows from A0 to  A1 and from A1 to  A0. Hence the industrial
dynamics of this economy is described by the following first order
ordinary differential equation:
(26)
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dt
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84System — (22a), (22b), (22c) e  (26) — jointly with cross
equation restrictions ((LEMMA 1b)), (23) and (25) — form a system
of four first order ordinary differential equations, whose solution
describes the dynamics of this economy for any admissible initial
value of the unknown functions of time VL
0, VL
1, VF
1 and m(A0). In
a steady state,
Given the analytical complexity of such system we resorted to
numerical analysis. In all numerical simulations, the steady state
exists, it is unique and it is saddle point stable for any set of
parameter values. In particular, in all numerical results
17 we obtain
a unique economically meaningful equilibrium, and determinacy of
equilibrium is (locally) guaranteed
18 because the linear
approximation around the steady state has three unstable manifolds
— associated with market variables VL
0,  VL
1, and VF
1 — and one
stable manifold — associated with predetermined variable m(A0).
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17 The files .mod, used to simulate the model in Matlab, are available from
the author on request.
18 A well known result derived within the analysis of the local stability of a
system of two differential equations is that if one solution of the characteristic
equation has real part greater than zero and the other solution has real part less
then zero, then the steady-state is a saddle-point. In this case, the system is unstable
for all initial conditions but the one that corresponds to the eigenvector associated
to the eigenvalue whose real part is less than zero. In order to analyze the stability
of the steady-state in our model, here we make use of a generalization of the
previous result to the case of a system of four differential equations. In fact, in
all our computations the Jacobian of the system (22a), (22b), (22c) and  (26)
computed at the steady state has three eigenvalues with positive real parts




1) and one eigenvalue with negative real part (associated with predetermined
variable m(A0)). In the economy a la Arrow-Debreu we analyze, market prices are
represented by the stock market values of each firm in each instant of time. They
are free to adjust (jump variables) until the economic system reaches the
equilibrium values compatible with the stock of ideas accumulated. The adjustment
to such equilibrium is unique because of the properties of the saddle point stability.
If, on the contrary, a continuum of paths to the equilibrium compatible with the
stock of ideas accumulated existed, clearly, we would be in presence of an
indeterminacy. Excellent bibliographical references on this subject are FARMER
R.E.A. (1993) and GANDOLFO G. (1997).Therefore, given an initial condition for m(A0), there is (locally) only
one initial condition for VL
0, VL
1, and VF
1, such that the generated
trajectory tends to the steady state vector, and the equilibrium is
determinate.
B) Unpatentable Research Tools
In this section we drop the assumption of patentable basic
scientific results. Lacking patent protection on half-ideas, the
innovative process would need to resort to non-profit motivated
R&D firms to start: publicly funded universities and laboratories
have often been motivated by the induced scientific spillovers on
potentially marketable future technical applications. This section
also introduces a singular behavioural rule for public researchers:
we assume that public researchers are not perfectly mobile across
sectors, so that when in a sector ω that lacked a half-idea, i.e.
belonged to A0, a half-idea appears, i.e. it becomes A1, the public
R&D workers keep carrying out basic research in that sector.
Given our technological assumptions, this behaviour will likely
lead to the discovery of a second half-idea that is redundant from
the economic view point. This may represent the case of university
researchers who keep investigating along intellectual trajectories
even when they know that no private firm will ever profit from
adapting to their market the new knowledge they may create. Of
course we are not excluding in principle that the efforts of publicly
hired scientists allow society to achieve important scientific
findings by focusing on the required basic R&D sectors. Still, the
assumption that public researchers may not do research with
commercial appeal seams to be reasonable: unguided by the
invisible hand, researchers will keep devoting their efforts proving
that they are able to invent a second, third, ..., n
th genial — but
socially useless — idea to enrich their cv and their academic
carrier opportunities. Hence, we will assume from here on that
the public researchers are allocated across different industries
according to a uniform distribution. In other terms, we are
assuming that the efforts of public researchers will be uniformly
RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2006
86distributed across the different basic R&D sectors: A0 industries,
in which half-idea is socially needed, and A1 industries where half-
ideas are redundant. Other assumptions about the public sector
are possible, as for example public researchers guided by altruism
for society (Cozzi and Galli, 2007a) or that the government uses
Kremer’s (1998) auctions to finance R&D (Cozzi and Galli, 2007b).
The assumption here formulated emphasizes the role of markets
to give R&D laboratories the right incentives to divert their
resources from the unprofitable sectors and to quickly reallocate
them towards more profitable aims.
We  also make the assumption that the government chooses
to hire a fixed global amount of skilled workers, L
–
G, to be allocated
in the heterogenous research activities conducted by universities
and other scientific institutions. The government basic R&D
expenditure, equal to L
–
Gws, is funded by lump sum per-capita taxes
on consumers. The assumption of lump sum taxation guarantees
that government R&D expenditure does not imply additional
distortions on private decisions. This allows us to use the previous
notation and derivations also in the case of a balanced government
budget taxing all households in order to transfer the tax proceeds
to the basic R&D workers.
The optimizing behaviour of the public sector consists in
maximizing the expected flow of half-ideas per sector with respect
to the intensity of basic research effort zG, that is the government
chooses the optimal scale for the public laboratories.
The fixed global amount of skilled workers, L
–
G, hired in the
basic public R&D is equal to the intensity of basic research effort,




LEMMA 3. The solution for the public sector maximization
problem is
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87PROOF (in APPENDIX 1.B).
Therefore, solving eq. (27) for NG and substituting the solution
of the government maximization problem, we have:
(28)
The financial arbitrage implies the following market
valuations of each sector’s unchallenged
19 leader firm, VL
0, directly
challenged leader firm, VL





Plugging eq. (28), and the optimal size of public laboratories
as given in LEMMA 3 into (29a) allows us to rewrite the equation
of leader’s financial arbitrage as:
(30)
Solving Bellman’s eq. (29c) and setting (as a consequence of
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19 We  here mean “unchallenged” by a follower. However, a monopolist in an
A0 industry is indirectly challenged by the basic R&D laboratories trying to invent
a new half-idea on which future follower firms will work to render it obsolete.
20 Notice that λ0NG
1–a √——– ZG–φ( VL
0–VL
1) captures the expected partial obsolescence
of unchallenged leadership in each A0 sector (29a), λ1NF
1–a √——– ZF–φ VL
1 the expected
final obsolescence of directly challenged leadership in each sector A1 (29b), and
λ1NF
a √——– ZF–φ( VL
0–VL
1) the probability per unit time that a single follower succeeds
in each sector A1 (29c).free entry) VF
1 = 0, we get the flow of researcher hired by each










From eq. (31c) we can solve for the skilled/unskilled wage
ratio, getting:
(32)
Let us remember that, from the final production analysis, we
have:
(33)
The dynamics of the industries is now described by the
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89From the following skilled labor market clearing condition:
(35) x + L –
G + (1 – m(A0))NF 2φ = L
Hence the equilibrium mass of per-sector followers is:
(36)
In the stationary distribution dm(A0)/dt= 0. Therefore the flow
of industries entering the A0 group must equal the flow of
industries entering the A1 group. Given the complexity of our
problem, also in this case we performed numerical simulations in
Matlab
21. In all simulations a unique economically meaningful
steady state exists and it is, at least locally, determinate.
3. - Comparing the Different Intellectual Property Regimes
This section draws the implications of the two intellectual
property scenarios we have depicted in the previous sections. To
compare the three different regimes, we assume that in the
scenarios with un-patentable research tools (case B) the
government chooses the same amount of basic R&D that the
private economy (case A) obtains in equilibrium. This allows us
to compare the different inefficiencies after controlling for the
different innovative public R&D employment level.
A first analytical result is expressed by the following:
LEMMA 4. As the congestion externality tends to disappear,
a→0, the equilibrium innovative performance of the private
economy with patentable research tools is better than the
equilibrium growth performance of the economy with an
inefficient public R&D sector.
PROOF (in APPENDIX 1.C).
Even when the congestion externality is present, the economy
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21 See note 17.carried out can lead to more innovation than an economy in which
the public basic research is conducted in an inertial way. The
following lemma shows that this will happen for sufficiently low
levels of applied R&D productivity parameter λ1:
LEMMA 5. As applied R&D productivity parameter λ1, becomes
very high, the equilibrium innovative performance of the private
economy with patentable research tools becomes worse than the
equilibrium growth performance of the economy with an
inefficient public R&D sector.
PROOF (in APPENDIX 1.C).
If instead it is relatively easy to find economic applications of
scientific ideas, most of the sectors will tend to need basic ideas.
Therefore the broadly focussed academic research by pure
scientists uninterested in economic applications will turn out to be
performing a useful service to the private R&D firms, by disclosing
a large spectrum of potentially profitable innovations. Though
blind to the invisible hand, the publicly run universities would
internalize their academic externalities and — if applied R&D is
simple enough or if basic research is difficult enough — would
allow the economy to reach a stronger innovative performance than
if we allowed the patenting of research tools by uncoordinated
basic R&D institutions. Table 1, built for constant values of all
parameters excepted λ1,summarizes the economy functioning for
different values of applied R&D productivity in the two different
intellectual property regimes: from Table 1 we easily infer that as
λ1 becomes very low the innovation rate in the first scenario
overcomes the equilibrium growth performance of the economy
with an inefficient public R&D sector. Simulation results also show
that, when λ1 varies, the measure of the A0 industries tends to be
∪-shaped. Such ∪-shaped curve is reported in Graph 5, where,
m0Priv and m0PuIneff denote, respectively, the equilibrium mass of A0
sectors in the private — i.e. with patentable research tools — basic
R&D economy, and the equilibrium mass of A0 sectors in the
inefficiently run public basic R&D economy.
The economic argument at the basis of this numerical result
Patents and Research Tools, etc. S. GALLI







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4is that as λ1→1, the half-ideas arriving from the basic research are
quickly completed, i.e. the A1 industries quite immediately shift
into  A0. If instead λ1→0, the half-ideas deriving from the basic
research will be slowly completed, but the decreasing in the skilled
wage level, connected to the increasing difficulty in completing
half-ideas, provides a disincentive for the basic R&D activity.
Therefore, as the time goes on, half-ideas will be slowly completed
and the A1 industries will gradually tend to disappear.
Graph 6, built on the data provided in Table 1, shows that for
sufficiently low levels of applied R&D productivity parameter λ1,
the innovation rate of the economy where research tools are
patentable and basic R&D is privately carried out overcomes the
economy with unpatentable research tools.
Graph 7 shows that in the United States the ratio of the
patents granted each year to US residents on applied R&D
expenditure per year (in year 2000 dollars) decreased by about
four fifths from 1953 to 1982. This confirms the existence of an
increasing complexity in the application of the basic scientific
results for commercial purposes. Such patents to R&D ratio is an
index of applied research productivity. We can view it as an


























































































































MEASURE OF THE SET OF INDUSTRIES
WITH NON HALF-IDEAS. SIMULATION RESULTS
Source: Simulation parameters α = 0.3; γ = 1.3; ρ = 0.05; L = 15; M = 60; a = 0.1;
λ0 = 0.5.empirical proxy for our parameter λ1. In fact, in terms of our
model, such ratio can be written as:
(37)
Plugging the flow of researchers employed by each follower
zF * = 2φ into (37), and letting a→0, we have:
(38)
In the light of the endogenous R&D-driven growth model with
















































Public Basic R&D Activity
Patented Research Tools 
GRAPH 6
COMPARISON OF THE INNOVATIVE
PERFORMANCES, SIMULATION RESULTSsequential R&D activity developed in the previous sections, these
remarks allow us to consider the policy change in favour of the
research tools patentability occurred in the United States from the
early Eighties as the rational policy result of a decrease in the
applied R&D productivity.
4. - Final Remarks
This paper has developed a general equilibrium R&D-driven
growth model in which the innovation process is decomposed into
two successive innovative stages. The extension of multisector
Schumpeterian models to a more realistic dimension allows us to
answer a question about the policy shift in the US towards the
extension of patentability to research tools and basic scientific
ideas. These normative innovations have been modifying the
industrial and academic lives in the last two decades. LEMMA 5
may suggest that one of the reasons why they were efficiently
introduced was the increased relative difficulty in the marketable
applications of basic scientific discoveries.






























































PATENTS-APPLIED R&D EXPENDITURE RATIO
(USA, 1953-1982)
Source: WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION and NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD
(2006).As the chances of finding profitable economic applications of
each scientific result get more and more remote, a larger number
of industries need to be endowed with basic ideas to try to build
upon, which means that the scientists should focus their research
energies in the sectors where important scientific results are still
lagging. This social need is less likely met by academic researchers
whose carrier proceeds when they show themselves able to
discover theoretical results regardless of the potential commercial
profits that applied R&D firms may make by building on their
inventions.
As documented by several studies, the last decades seem
characterized by a higher relative complexity at the applied stage
of scientific innovations than at the basic stage. In light of the
model results, the aggregate economic innovation rate would
benefit from the patent races among profit seeking scientific
institutions.
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97APPENDIX
1.A - PROOF OF LEMMA 1
a) Consider the outsider profits maximization problem in a
A0 industry (eq. (21a) in text):
(39)
The first order condition for a maximum is: 
(40)
Since other outsider firms can freely enter each first half-idea
patent race, in equilibrium the unskilled labor real wage will adjust
such that expected profits will be annihilated at the optimal firm
size. Therefore in any equilibrium with positive R&D activity, the
stock value of every first half-idea R&D firm, VO, will be zero, and
the average and marginal product of research will be equal, i.e.
(41)
Solving eq. (40) and the last implication of (41) for  zO, we
obtain the equilibrium amount of labour, zO *, employed by each
outsider R&D firm:
(42) zO * = 2φ
b) Plugging (42) into (41) allows us to find the positive R&D
equilibrium value of the skilled wage ratio as:
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In eq. (43), we have constrained the equilibrium skilled wage
not to be lower than the unskilled wage, because otherwise the
skilled workers would apply for unskilled jobs. Notice that if the
skilled wage were lower than
there would be excess demand for skilled labor, because the freely
entrant basic R&D firms would try to make unboundedly high
profits. Hence ws would immediately increase. If instead the wage
was higher than the r.h.s. of eq. (43) no basic R&D would be carried
out, and eventually no R&D at all. Unlike Aghion and Howitt (1992)
and Grossman and Helpman (1991), such no growth path would
never afflict the economy depicted in our model, because of the
assumed form of decreasing sectoral returns in each R&D sector. 
Q.E.D.
PROOF OF LEMMA 2. Consider the follower’s profit maximization
problem (eq. (21b) in text):
(44)
whose first order condition for a maximum is:
(45)
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991.B - PROOF OF LEMMA 3. From eq. (27) we have:
(47)
The public authorities seek to maximize the per sector
expected flow of half ideas by choosing the optimal scale for public
laboratories:
(48)




1.C - PROOF OF LEMMA 4. Letting m0priv denote the equilibrium
mass of A0 sectors in the private — i.e. with patentable research
tools — basic R&D economy, m0PuEff the equilibrium mass of A0
sectors in the efficiently run public — i.e. with unpatentable
research tools — basic R&D economy, m0PuIneff the equilibrium
mass of A0 sectors in the inefficiently run public basic R&D
economy, the following relationship holds: 
(50)
The innovation rate of the private basic R&D economy is:
(51)
The innovation rate of the public inefficient economy is:
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100(52)
By dividing eq. (51) for (52), and letting a→0, we get:
(53)
Q.E.D.
PROOF OF LEMMA 5. Consider the following ratio: 
(54)
Let us first note that
is a positive number lower than 1 for all value of a between zero
and 1/2. To see this, remind that
and that it is positive when 0<a<1/2. Moreover, it is strictly
decreasing for 0≤a<1/2 which is seen in a simple way by derivating
its natural logaritm with respect to a, and getting:
Let us now note that, from the properties of our model the
limit, as λ1 tends to infinity, the measure of A0 tends to 1 in both
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101economies, because in the limit the applied R&D has infinite
productivity (λ1→∞) and more and more new half-idea tends to
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22 Notice that in this case our model behaves as the standard quality ladder
growth model — in which A0=[0,1] — and no completing half-ideas are required.BIBLIOGRAPHY
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